Complex networks of corruption

Pablo Morales and Jorge Finke Universidad Javeriana Santiago de Cali, Colombia finke@ieee.org



Case study 1

Case study 2

Case study 3

Case study 4

. . .

Case study 1


Case study 2


Case study 3

Case study 4


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
does a pattern emerge?






Threshold Effects of Corruption








N. Bose et al., Threshold Effects of Corruption: Theory and Evidence. World Development, 36 (7), 2008.

Key questions

- Can capturing patterns help us:
 - understand corrupt norms? Th value?
 - design specific anti-corruption policies?
- Limitations of analytic approaches?
 - human incentives
 (bounded + unbounded rational players)
 - social networks (contact + financial networks)
- Agent-based modeling as public policy simulators?

Focus


- Micro motives (local mechanisms) that leads to macro phenomenon (e.g., threshold effect)
- Model the structure and dynamic processes on networks



Outline

- Social networks
 - generation of patterns of corruption
 - hypothetical generation mechanism
- Advantages + disadvantages
- Your opinion / suggestion?

Complex social networks



Which vertex would proof most crucial?

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statistical properties!!


Structure

Social networks are not random!

- 1. Possible mechanisms guiding network formation
- 2. Ways to exploit structure to achieve certain aims

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- 2. Ways to exploit structure to achieve certain aims



Small-word

Stanley Milgram. "The Small World Problem". Psychology Today, May 1967.

The basic experiment:


- The name of the target person + certain information (orient the participants towards specific individuals)
- If you do not know the target person on a first-hand bases, do not try to contact him directly
- A roster on which each person in the chain writes his name (prevent endless looping)


The Small-World


By Stanley Milgram

Almost all of us have had the experience of encountering someone far from home, who, to our surprise, turns out to share a mutual acquaintance with us. This kind of experience occurs with sufficient frequency so that our language even provides a cliché to be uttered at the appropriate moment of recognizing mutual acquaintances.

We say, "My it's a small world."








$$\ell = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{2}n(n+1)} \sum_{i \ge j} d_{ij}$$


Stanley Milgram, The small world problem. Phycology today, 1967

Transitivity or clustering


"A friend of a friend is also my friend"








intransitive




transitive



network	type	n	m	z	ℓ	α	$C^{(1)}$	$C^{(2)}$
film actors	undirected	449 913	25516482	113.43	3.48	2.3	0.20	0.78
company directors	undirected	7673	55 392	14.44	4.60	_	0.59	0.88
math coauthorship	undirected	253 339	496 489	3.92	7.57	_	0.15	0.34
physics coauthorship	undirected	52909	245 300	9.27	6.19	_	0.45	0.56
biology coauthorship	undirected	1520251	11803064	15.53	4.92	_	0.088	0.60
telephone call graph	undirected	47000000	80 000 000	3.16		2.1		
email messages	directed	59912	86 300	1.44	4.95	1.5/2.0		0.16
email address books	directed	16 881	57029	3.38	5.22	_	0.17	0.13
student relationships	undirected	573	477	1.66	16.01	_	0.005	0.001
sexual contacts	undirected	2810				3.2		

M. E. J. Newman, The structure and function of complex networks, SIAM Review, 45, 167-256 (2003)


Strogatz-Watts



high cluster large path length


low cluster small path length


Strogatz-Watts



high cluster large path length


low cluster small path length






Dynamics

Agent-based model





Payoffs

$$E = (1 - C)[F\alpha^* + (1 - F)\beta] + C(\beta - k\beta)$$
(1)

$$E > \beta$$
 (2)

where:

E is the utility to evaluate

C: a subjective factor that represents the fear of being discovered

F: a subjective factor that indicates the confidence that the corrupt act succeed


 α is the profit (payoff) of corrupt behavior

 α^* is the expectation of corruption and is calculated as $\alpha^* = (1-i)\alpha$

i: honesty index, and is obtained from a Gaussian random distribution

k: sentence period applied to the corrupt agents who are captured. It is expressed in number of iterations

 β is the profit (payoff) of honest behavior



Implications?

Lawmakers have not yet considered the consequences of [network structure].

Still understanding the way we are connected is an essential step in creating a more just society and in implementing public policies affecting everything from public health to the economy

N. Christakis and J. Fowler Connected (2009), p. 31


No single model can account for all corrupt behavior

All models are wrong but some are useful

George E. P. Box

Evaluate alternatives


pattern of corruption



generation mechanism 1

generation mechanism 2 generation mechanism 3

Evaluate alternatives



Advantages

- Framework for studying causal relationships
- If A leads to B, at least one mechanism must exist
- Different mechanisms can be classified into systematic categories for influencing the level of corruption
- Consensus?

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Disadvantages

- Generation mechanisms are hypothetical. Real?
- Need for validation (e.g., using statistics)

Final remarks

- 1. Our lives are deeply intertwined with complex networks (explain patterns)
- 2. Potential of data + networks
- 3. Good network models can shape...
 - collection of data
 - questions being asked
 - design of official responses
 - close the gap between systemic thinkers and policy-makers

Some additional reading...

- Networks: An Introduction (M. Newman, 2010)
- Linked
 (A.-L. Barabasi, 2003)
- Connected (N. Christakis and J. Fowler, 2009)
- Generative Social Science: Studies in Agent-Based Computational Modeling (J. Epstein, 2007)
- Super Crunchers
 (I. Ayres, 2008)
- Behavioral Law and Economics (C. Sunstein, 2000)

