Courting Corruption:
The Logic of Corruption Prosecutions in a New Democracy

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Passau University
Temporal variation

East Java (2001-2009)
Spatial variation

East Java (2009)
Research Strategy

1. Explorative qualitative case studies
   - 4 cases
   - 70+ interviews
   - Case docs

2. Theorization

3. Formalization

4. Newspaper case dataset
   - 2 provinces
   - 470,000 pages
   - 30,000 articles

1.2.3.4.
Research locations
# Two-part model

**Part 1: Investigation Outcome**
**Part 2: Local Political and Central Government Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Political Support</th>
<th>Central Government Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>High (Possible, Highly Likely)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low (Unlikely, Likely)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None (Highly Unlikely, N/A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 1 –
Stage game

- **Players**  The Enforcer (E) and the Suspect (S)
- **Player function**  \( P(\otimes) = E, S \)
- **Strategic form**

![Game Matrix]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Collude</th>
<th>Defect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong></td>
<td>3, 3</td>
<td>0, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4, 0</td>
<td>1, 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 1 – Enforcer-Suspect collusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local political coalition pressure</th>
<th>Position of key central government institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- $T_0 = \text{No local mobilisation}$
- $T_1 = \text{Low mobilisation (or...)}$
Part 2 –
Local mobilization-central support

• Local opposition
  – Central government signals, are they serious?
  – Constraints, threats of local retaliation

• Central government
  – National elections, anti-corruption credentials
  – Centre-periphery alliances, voter mobilisation
Summary